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 5 
Introduction 
 
The military coup d’état of September 1973 which overthrew the democratically elected 
Marxist government of Salvador Allende, and the regime which ruled Chile for the 
following sixteen years in the name of restoring Christian values and order, presented 
many moral and political dilemmas for the Chilean Catholic Church. Military rule altered 
Chile’s political, economic and social landscape so profoundly that traditional democratic 
actors were demobilised; the Church’s response and actions therefore took on a unique 
political significance. 
 
Consequently, the restoration of democracy in Chile in 1990 was the product of a long 
process of mobilisation, reconciliation and negotiation. Manuel Antonio Garretón’s 
numerous studies of the evolution of the transition process, and his assessment of the 
accumulative factors which gradually opened the way back to a democratic system, 
highlight the overarching importance of two main actors in leading the transition: 
mobilised civil society and political parties.
1
 Schneider and Oxhorn have described the 
challenge of mobilised shanty town communities and popular organisations to the 
regime’s legitimacy and the destabilising effects that its demands for the return of full 
democracy had on the regime. Valenzuela and Valenzuela, Oppenheim, Siavelis, 
Garretón and Loveman all give detailed context and analysis of the oppositional efforts of 
political parties from the whole ideological spectrum, and their responses to the imposed 
conditions which irrevocably altered the constitutional system. 
                                                 
1
 M.A. Garreton in Drake and Jaksic, (eds.) 1991 
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The prominence of these two actors in leading the transition is evident from an 
examination of the main political developments during the period of military rule. 
Following the coup, the regime dismantled the country’s political, institutional and 
economic systems in favour of new authoritarian and neoliberal structures. There was 
little significant oppositional activity, other than what Garretón calls ‘resistance’2 for the 
first ten years of military rule; such was the severity of repressive measures used against 
opponents and the considerable strength of sectors supportive of the regime’s efforts. In 
1980, the regime institutionalised its rule through a new Constitution and prescribed the 
powers civilian actors and the armed forces were to have in Chile’s political future. 
Alarmed by this and the financial crisis which rocked the economy from 1981-1982, the 
first oppositional movement emerged from civil society in the form of national protests 
demanding the demise of the regime and the return to democracy. This brought a degree 
of political opening, encouraging the reorganisation of political parties and initiating 
processes of dialogue, both with the regime and between previously uncooperative 
parties. On reaching consensus for a democratic alternative, the opposition parties formed 
the Concertación coalition, defeating Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite and, after also 
winning the 1989 presidential elections with its candidate Patricio Aylwin, became the 
new democratic government inaugurated in 1990.    
 
The imposition of authoritarian rule and the gradual efforts for transition that followed 
presented a challenge for the Catholic Church. There is a significant literature on the 
opportunities for cooperation or confrontation for the Catholic Church presented by 
                                                 
2
 M.A. Garreton in Cavarrozzi and Garreton, (eds.) 1987, p.403 
 7 
mass-based, revolutionary and authoritarian regimes across Latin America by Levine, 
Mainwaring, Berryman and Wilde
3
. Studies of the Catholic Church in Chile during this 
period have focussed principally on its relations with the regime, and their evolving 
confrontations. Smith, Fleet, Sigmund and Bouvier’s various works detail the 
increasingly oppositional responses to the regime of Catholics at different levels, 
particularly focussing on bishops; Lowden shows the formation of the Church as moral 
opposition to the regime through its denunciation of human rights, and Cancino’s book 
describes the institutional conflict between the Church and the regime. All thoroughly 
examine the challenges for the Church operating under a regime with which its own 
views were increasingly at odds.  
 
This study, however, will assess the extent to which the Church’s work during this period 
interacted with the efforts of the social and political actors mentioned above to initiate a 
transition to democracy, and how far it contributed to making a political change possible, 
rather than its frictions with the regime itself. The chapters will examine three areas of 
the Church’s work which had significant political impact. The first chapter will look at 
the public voice that the Church was afforded by the regime and how far this was used to 
promote democratic ideals and the defence of human rights, and the effect of this on the 
demise of the regime. The second chapter focuses on the Church’s interaction with the 
efforts of the first leading political actor in the transition: civil society; through its support 
of popular organising and protests; while the third examines how far the Church 
supported the political opposition in forming a viable democratic alternative to the 
                                                 
3
 Levine 1979 and 1986, Mainwaring 1986, Berryman 1984 and 1987,  Wilde 1989 
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military regime. In this way, it is intended that the wide range and capacity of the 
Church’s work for change is evident, both at the grassroots and with elites. 
 
The Church’s role in a political process 
  
The Catholic Church in Chile is not a political institution, nor have the motives for its 
work ever pretended to be politically orientated. Where, then, is its significance as an 
institution in a clearly political process? This can be explained firstly in the context of the 
progressive developments within the Catholic Church in both Chile and Latin America in 
the years preceding the military coup, and secondly, because the extreme restrictions 
imposed by the regime on all organisational activity effectively created a political 
vacuum, causing some of the Church’s work with social, humanitarian and religious 
motivations to have an inevitable, though often unintentional, political impact. 
 
Progressive developments in the Catholic Church 
 
A strong progressive element in the Chilean Church developed ‘relatively early’ in the 
twentieth century compared with other Latin American Churches.
4
 Catholic Action 
programmes were formed for social action in 1931,
5
 and there was a growing 
consciousness of the need for reform of political and economic structures to ensure social 
justice for the poor. This sense of the Church’s social responsibility towards the 
marginalised was not unique to Chile and formed part of discussions at the Second 
                                                 
4
 Adriance, 1992, p.S53 
5
 Smith and Fleet, 1997, p.41 
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Vatican Council of 1962-1965. What became known as the ‘preferential option for the 
poor’6 became institutionalised in the Latin American Church at the Conference of Latin 
American bishops held in Medellin, Colombia in 1968. The need to ‘give effective 
preference to the poorest, most needy and segregated sectors’7 emerging from this 
conference changed the face of Latin American Catholicism, finding expression in the 
growing Liberation Theology movement, inspired by Peruvian theologian Gustavo 
Gutiérrez, and a growing network of base Christian communities which existed to 
promote values of social justice alongside religious teaching and evangelism. Although 
strongly conservative elements remained influential, especially at higher levels of the 
Church hierarchy, there was a notable shift in official discourse that work with the 
socially and economically marginalised must accompany the evangelistic mission of the 
Church in Latin America as an intrinsic part of the gospel.  
 
The timing of these developments within the Latin American Church influenced the 
Chilean Church’s response to its national politics. It strongly supported the reformist 
Christian Democrat government of Eduardo Frei from 1964-1970, not only as an 
alternative to Marxism but also to improve conditions for Chile’s lower classes.8 Its 
commitment to defending human dignity and the rights of the poor, formalised at 
Medellin, crucially influenced a more defensive position towards the dramatic changes 
imposed by the military in 1973. By placing greater emphasis on its social responsibility, 
it acted and spoke on behalf of the socially excluded, which were the very sectors 
                                                 
6
 CELAM, 1979 
7
 CELAM, 1968 
8
 Adriance, 1992, p.S54 
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Pinochet sought to suppress. This inevitably brought political connotations to the 
Church’s social initiatives. 
 
The Church in a political vacuum 
 
Pinochet and the military junta took over all executive and legislative powers from the 
democratic government of Salvador Allende in September 1973 after the country had 
reached the point of institutional crisis, economic collapse and social unrest, for reasons 
discussed in Chapter 3. The Chilean political party system was held to blame for the 
national crisis, and the junta therefore aimed to radically deconstruct that system to 
destroy ‘the virus of partyism,’ partly involving the elimination of the ‘totalitarian 
threat’9 of Marxism by removing all Leftist political party members from society. In 
addition, all political institutions were dismantled, Congress was disbanded, all Leftist 
parties were made illegal and the others put into recess before also becoming illegal in 
1977. Media censorship and strict curfews were also enforced,
10
 the trade union 
movement and public sector organisations were repressed and military administrators 
assumed control of universities.
11
 In particular, an effort was made to cut the traditionally 
strong links between political parties and civil society by banning all social and political 
organisational activity, thereby dismantling citizen access to political power and closing 
all channels of participation.
12
  The restrictions were particularly enforced in areas in 
                                                 
9
 Pinochet, 1983 in Loveman, 1986 p.3 
10
 Sigmund, 1986 p.32 
11
 Loveman, 1986 p. 9 
12
 Valenzuela and Valenzuela (eds.), 1986, p.213 
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which Leftist party organising had traditionally been strong, namely more working class 
and less developed urban areas, called poblaciones.  
 
The Church was one of the only remaining institutions in Chilean society that was 
allowed to continue functioning autonomously, due to its historic moral prestige in 
society and the military’s need of it for legitimacy, given the regime’s desire to represent 
traditional Christian values as a preferable alternative to atheist Marxism.
13
 It must be 
remembered that despite many of the Church’s actions seeming to show a pro-democratic 
stance, the Church maintained official political neutrality throughout the duration of the 
military regime and never broke relations with Pinochet or declared his government 
illegitimate. However, by necessity, and due to the political vacuum left by the lack of 
representation and political activity, the Church’s work and engagement with society 
expanded rapidly to counter the regime’s repressive measures, reaching into arenas 
traditionally occupied by political parties or social organisations. Though the justification 
for these new areas of work was always defined in moral and humanitarian terms, to 
protect the dignity of human life and to promote peace, its impact often extended into the 
realm of the political. 
 
Clarifying concepts and scope of this study 
 
This topic is subject to the complexity of using broad categories of definitions; both in 
the sometimes uncertain or subjective boundaries of what constitutes particular concepts, 
for example, ‘the moral’ or ‘the political,’ which share areas of commonality. This study 
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 Loveman, 1986 p.8, Valenzuela and Valenzuela (eds.), 1986 p.191  
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seeks to work with this ambiguity to illustrate that the Church’s work had such 
significance for the transition precisely because of this commonality. The clearly political 
was avoided; while moral service extending into the political was more acceptable. 
 
Similarly, the discussion centres on a global and hierarchical Catholic Church, which 
even within Chile is highly heterogeneous in social class, political opinion, theology and 
doctrine, meaning that a reference to ‘the Church’ can rarely encompass all elements 
accurately. For this reason, more specific terms will be used where possible, though ‘the 
Church’ will be used for general references to the institution. Because of this diversity, 
this study will attempt to show the broad range of its work for influencing political 
change: from the upper levels of Church hierarchy referred to in Chapters 1 and 3, to the 
more radical and progressive Church of the grassroots in Chapter 2. The same diversity 
and heterogeneity, however, led to some contradictions and complexities within the 
Church’s work, where extreme differences in political opinion pulled the Church in 
different directions.  
 
In addition, I will be working with a definition of democracy beyond the electoral 
mechanisms and elite negotiations emphasised by O’Donnell and Schmitter,14 to full 
social and economic democracy based on the public contestation, active citizen 
participation and popular sovereignty in all areas of public life similar to that described in 
Robert Dahl’s theory of Polyarchy.15 Therefore a discussion of the Church’s 
‘contribution to democracy,’ does not refer only to the restoration of free elections, but 
                                                 
14
 O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986 
15
 Dahl, 1979 p.7  
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also to the freedom to organise, associate, dissent and participate in economic and social 
policy without risk to personal security. The authoritarian establishment of governance 
created by the Chilean armed forces will be referred to not as the ‘military government’ 
or ‘the dictatorship’, which, while both used within academic literature, have strong 
associations for Chileans of Right and Left persuasions respectively; instead here the 
more neutral term ‘military regime’ will be used. 
 
The international influence on Chilean politics during this period was not insignificant in 
the context of the Cold War, with the perceived threat of Allende’s government much 
amplified through its ties with the Soviet Union, and the pressures of the United States 
influencing Pinochet through sanctions out of concern for human rights violations, and 
through an increased presence to verify the conditions of the 1988 plebiscite and 1989 
election. However, this study will focus on national events, excluding as well the 
influence of exile politics, both due to its limited scope, and due to the fact that the 
international environment, though influential, did not significantly alter the course of 
events,
16
 unlike in many parts of Central America where national politics was directly 
dependent on international factors. Similarly, this study does not pretend that the Catholic 
Church is the only Christian Church with a significant following in Chile; to the contrary, 
protestant denominations are stronger there than in many other parts of Latin America. 
However, they do not form a part of this study because, apart from some notable 
exceptions working in human rights or solidarity organisations, most protestant 
Christians supported or accepted the regime rather than working for political change.
17
  
                                                 
16
 Skidmore and Smith, 2001 p.132, A. Valenzuela in Linz, Diamond and Lipset (eds.) 1999 p.220 
17
 Interviews with Aldunate 06/07/09, Lagos 21/07/09 and Wehrli 21/07/09  
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Methodology 
 
Primary research for this study was carried out in Santiago, Chile over the period of one 
month between June and July 2009 and consisted of interviews and the consultation of 
archival documentation, Episcopal Declarations, and press articles. 
 
The eleven interviewees were Church representatives, political party representatives and 
those involved in the human rights work and organisations of the Church during the 
military regime, and all except one were directly involved in the processes described. 
They covered numerous political perspectives, and included men and women, Catholics, 
atheists and protestants, and representatives from the base and elite levels of society. 
With this range of opinions I was able to ascertain the way in which the political 
significance was perceived by those within the Church, by those at the forefront of 
leading the political process itself, and by professionals involved with the Church’s work 
at different levels, many of whom were not practicing Catholics. Efforts were made to 
secure interviews from more conservative sectors, though due to a lack of response I 
instead consulted works written by the individuals in question to ensure representation 
from the Left, Centre and Right of the political spectrum; however this would be a future 
area in which the present research could be expanded. 
 
I consulted Episcopal declarations, the Jesuit opposition magazine Mensaje and archival 
documents from the Fundación de Documentación y Archivo de la Vicaria de la 
 15 
Solidaridad for official and unofficial Church views and publications. To gain a sense of 
secular views on the significance of the Church’s work in the political process I consulted 
El Mercurio, the proregime daily newspaper and Analisis, a intellectual opposition 
regime magazine, (as no opposition newspapers were permitted until 1987). 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Church’s Public Voice 
 
The military junta which seized power in Chile in September 1973 imposed conditions 
attempting the depoliticisation of Chilean society, which as well as the deconstruction of 
the political system and institutions, included restrictions on freedoms of expression and 
opinion, press censorship, and the prohibition of political activity or organisation. These 
restrictions were heightened during various states of emergency and formed part of the 
junta’s National Security Doctrine in which, like other Latin American military regimes 
which O’Donnell has named ‘Bureaucratic Authoritarian’, they claimed to be defending 
the population from external and internal subversion which was considered a threat to a 
peaceful national life and the maintenance of order.
18
 
 
In this context, the Catholic Church became the only remaining institution with relative 
freedom to express opinions contrary to official regime rhetoric, due to its high level of 
prestige in society and the regime’s perception of the Church as a necessary provider of 
moral legitimacy. The Church used this public voice to raise concerns regarding national 
social, economic and political conditions, and to present a reality at odds with the 
prosperity and success claimed by the regime, despite a huge diversity of political 
opinion between Catholics of different social classes.  
 
                                                 
18
 O’Donnell, 1988 p.31-32 
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This chapter will examine how far this public voice had an impact for political change in 
the three main areas in which it was expressed: in the Episcopal declarations regarding 
regime practices and societal problems; the denunciations of human rights abuses; and 
the promotion of opposition or critical publications. 
 
Episcopal Declarations 
 
The declarations issued by the Permanent Committee of the Chilean Episcopate during 
1973-1988 represented the Church’s official voice in society, and were widely heard 
throughout Catholic and secular society. They reveal a compromised middle ground 
between the varied opinions held by the upper hierarchy, rather than the whole Church. 
 
Smith, Viera-Gallo and Bouvier, among others, have carried out extensive analyses of 
Episcopal statements during the military regime, focussing particularly on the 
deteriorating relations with the regime and the Episcopate’s move from ambiguity to 
opposition
19
. In contrast, this examination will focus on the way in which this voice from 
Chile’s bishops promoted democratic values and conditions, making pronouncements 
where these were considered inadequate. Though the declarations were intended as a 
moral and spiritual, rather than political, voice of the nation, they commented on political 
circumstances where the moral rights of citizens were affected.  
 
                                                 
19
 Smith 1982, Smith in Valenzuela and Valenzuela (eds), 1986,  Smith 1997,  Viera-Gallo in Gazmuri 
1988, Beauvier 1983 
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The hierarchy was consistently anxious to maintain official neutrality, not favouring any 
political tendency over another, or giving or denying government legitimacy. This was in 
order to maintain basic relations with Pinochet’s government and freedom for its 
religious and evangelistic activities, as well as from the basic conviction that, as a moral 
and spiritual institution, the Church should not involve itself in national politics; and in 
1975 they clarified: ‘The bishops have no commitment to any political party, social class 
or economic interest; we are neither for nor against this government or any other.’20 
Criticism of social conditions was therefore initially balanced and qualified with respect 
for the armed forces, gratitude for their efforts and pleas to the people for cooperation and 
non-violence.  
 
Tensions in this neutral political position emerged with worsening human rights 
violations, political and social exclusion, and deepening economic suffering, occurring 
alongside regime consolidation. In October 1978 the bishops defended the fact that 
‘political matters…are a legitimate preoccupation of the Church,’21 while renouncing 
direct political intervention. The Church’s right to political comment was also justified 
with international Church authority, often in the writings of previous Popes, including the 
often cited example: ‘The Church may give its moral judgement, including upon subjects 
referring to the political order, when the fundamental rights of the person demand it’.22  
This right to comment on the political was used to promote the need for improved 
democratic conditions, which was mentioned with greater boldness as social suffering 
                                                 
20
 CPEC, 05/09/75, in Mensaje 243, Oct 1975 
21
 CPEC, 04/10/78 in CPEC, 1982 p.349 
22
 CPEC,  03/77 in Mensaje 257, Apr 1977 p.166 and 168 and CPEC, 23/08/80 in Mensaje 292 Sept 1980 
p.519 
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worsened .These democratic conditions centre around one main concern: the need for 
popular participation for the healthy functioning of government, social peace and for the 
legitimacy of political processes.  
 
Popular political participation was promoted in the declarations as the basic right of every 
citizen and ‘fundamental for democracy.’23 Concerns were often raised that the lack of 
adequate channels of popular expression left ‘the majority of Chileans without a real 
possibility of participation.’24 It was deemed necessary by the bishops for the social 
autonomy of popular organisations in communications with the authorities, for successful 
local government,
25
 for the majority to take part in making decisions affecting them, and 
for pluralism and diversity of opinion to be respected.
26
 
 
The Episcopate also showed effective participation to be central in the introduction of 
new political and economic models by the military regime; in 1977, stating that ‘It is 
clear that a country can…opt for a new political model, but that new structuring cannot 
emerge other than as the product of a free and mature national consensus, legitimately 
expressed,’27 Similarly, the economic suffering of the country’s poorest citizens is one of 
the areas in which the Church spoke with most regularity and boldness, condemning the 
exclusive nature of the new neoliberal model’s implementation without popular 
consensus. The bishops state that for those living in ‘unbearable conditions’, namely 
peasants, workers and pobladores,  
                                                 
23
 CPEC, 04/10/78 in CPEC, 1982 p.383 
24
 CPEC, 17/12/82 in Mensaje 316 Jan-Feb 1983 p.73 
25
 CPEC, 04/10/78 in CPEC, 1982 p.383-384 
26
CPEC, 05/09/75, in Mensaje 243, Oct 1975 p.472 
27
 CPEC,  03/77 in Mensaje 257, Apr 1977 p.167  
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‘in the name of participation, the Church asks that the diverse economic opinions be 
submitted to an open debate, asks that the access to decisions and the possibility of 
exercising pressure would not be reserved only for a scientific school, or for more 
privileged economic groups.’28  
 
Finally in the 1980s, with increasing social tensions due to the economic crisis of 1981-
1982, repression of political protests and continued exclusion, the Episcopate’s demands 
for effective participation became more urgent, and necessary in the prevention of social 
and violence. The Church claimed peace would only be reached with ‘all Chilean people 
free and responsible to actively participate,’29 and that exclusion and closed structures 
must be remedied by the re-establishing of ‘effective channels of participation at every 
level: in the universities, in politics, in work, in base organisations.’30 
 
The Episcopate also used popular participation as a measure of the legitimacy of political 
processes. They emphasised the necessity of popular approval of the formulation of the 
1980 Constitution,
31
 and prior to the September 1980 constitutional plebiscite, the 
Episcopate presented a number of conditions for the plebiscite to be considered ‘an 
authentic expression of the national feeling,’ including freedom of votes, sufficient access 
to information, and not grouping multiple criteria to be answered with a single ‘Yes’ or 
                                                 
28
 Ibid, p.169 
29
 CPEC, 10/09/86 in CPEC, 1988 p.167 
30
 CPEC 13/07/86 in CPEC 1988 p.156 
31
 CPEC,  03/77 in Mensaje 257, Apr 1977, p169  
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‘No’ response.32 Before the 1988 plebiscite for the extension of Pinochet’s presidency, 
the Church encouraged electoral inscription by all so that the result would most 
accurately represent popular will.
33
 While no pronouncement was made about the 1980 
Constitution itself, modifications to the text were requested by the Episcopate with regard 
to the mode of transition it prescribed.
34
  
 
The numerous limitations on the Church’s political pronouncements such as the diversity 
of bishops’ opinions, the desire not to alienate any sectors of Catholics, and pressure from 
the Vatican to remain entirely removed from politics, especially after 1978 when John 
Paul II became Pope, shaped Episcopal statements. They promoted democratic values 
and principles over specific judgements on how to vote or details of political structures. 
Despite these limitations, the Episcopate clearly felt it had a responsibility to speak out 
regarding the reestablishment of democratic norms with increasing urgency; in 1982 
asserting that, in contrast to the regime’s constant use of fear of the past to defend its 
prolonged hold on power, ‘The abuses of the past do not justify such a long interruption 
in the normal life of a nation. This is not healthy and has brought us the consequences 
that we now lament. Opening the channels of political participation is an urgent task.’35 
      
A voice for the defence of human rights 
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 CPEC, 23/08/80, Mensaje 292 Sept 1980 p.519 
33
 CPEC, 13/08/87 in CEPC, 1988 p.246 
34
 CPEC, 10/08/88 in Mensaje 372, Sept 1988 p.408 
35
 CPEC, 17/12/82 in Mensaje 316 Jan-Feb 1983 p.74 
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The human rights work of Catholic Church organisations under Pinochet formed the basis 
of the Church’s ‘moral opposition’36 to the regime. As arguably the most effective area of 
the Church’s work at the time, it forms part of the way in which the Church used its 
public voice to demand change.  
 
The immediate response of the base Church to human rights emergencies precedes the 
official denunciations of abuses. Wide scale repression of Left political party members 
began immediately after the coup, and included those active at a grassroots level and 
those who had formed part of the overthrown Left coalition Unidad Popular, or UP 
government. It affected even members of the Centrist Partido Democrata Cristiana, or 
PDC after the initial wave against the Left. This process formed part of the regime’s 
strategy to eradicate all Marxist influence from Chilean society with violence and 
intimidation. The politicians, militants, and sympathisers that were unable to escape were 
arrested, ‘disappeared’, tortured, murdered, taken to concentration camps or forced into 
exile. 
 
In this imposed climate of fear, the Church were uniquely positioned to respond to the 
humanitarian crisis caused by regime repression, and in October 1973, the Comité de 
Cooperación para la Paz en Chile, or Comite Pro Paz was created by the Catholic and 
Protestant Churches and the Jewish Community, to respond to the growing needs of 
Chileans who had been imprisoned, to assist the families of those who had been killed or 
disappeared, and to provide legal support to those being tried in war tribunals
37
. From 
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 Lowden, 1996, p.1 
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1973 to the end of 1975 the Comité Pro Paz was the main organisation for defence of 
victims of repression who were powerless to denounce the violence they suffered. 
 
The Comité Pro Paz was forced to close at the end of 1975 after increasing tensions with 
the regime, accusations of Marxist infiltration due to its support of the politically 
persecuted and a personal request from Pinochet. At the beginning of 1976, however, 
Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez, who was instrumental in the Church’s effective defence 
of human rights; authorised and opened the Vicaría de la Solidaridad. The Vicaría, as it 
is known, continued and expanded the work of the Comité Pro Paz, but was more closely 
associated with and protected by the Catholic Church, symbolically situated beside the 
main Cathedral in central Santiago. The Vicaría was run by Catholic and non-Catholic 
professionals and funded by international religious organisations and NGOs. They 
assisted and protected associations established by families of the politically executed and 
the disappeared,
38
 set up citizen human rights groups in many areas of the city, provided 
medical care to torture victims and legal assistance to those who had lost jobs for political 
reasons, exiles and those standing trial. 
 
Pamela Lowden’s book Moral Opposition to Authoritarian Rule details the nature of the 
Vicaría’s human rights work, how it became an oppositional institution and the 
development of its growing antagonism with the regime. She claims that this work ‘was 
the only public form of opposition that existed at the time’ except for a limited union 
                                                 
38
 Ensalaco, 2001 p.63 
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presence.
39
 The Comité Pro Paz and the Vicaría also opened the way for secular human 
rights organisations emerging in the late 1970s.
40
  
 
The Episcopal Declarations also clearly denounced the use of violence by the regime and 
called for it to respect the dignity of every person,
 41
 to investigate the whereabouts of the 
disappeared,
42
 for the renunciation of all violence, torture and terrorism,
43
 and accused 
the regime’s of its failure to observe even its own constitutional laws regarding human 
rights.
44
 
 
The Vicaría, and to a lesser extent the Episcopate’s consistent public condemnations of 
regime violence through its work and publications transformed the Church into a voice 
for the persecuted as well as the poor. The Church and particularly the Vicaría became 
greatly respected within international human rights circles and the recipients of much 
foreign aid.
45
 For conservative Catholic and non-Catholic sectors, however, the 
association with human rights was strongly criticised as being outside the Church’s 
proper field of responsibility. For this reason the human rights work, Cardinal Silva, the 
Comité Pro Paz and the Vicaría all came under severe attack at different times by the 
regime itself, conservative Catholic groups such as Opus Dei,
46
 The Chilean Society for 
Tradition, Family and Property, and mainstream pro-regime press. Common accusations 
were of Marxist infiltration and Leftist persuasion of sectors of the institution and of 
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individuals, and that their work supported and aided ‘terrorists.’47 Therefore, the 
denunciations were boldly and publicly made, though did not represent unanimous 
Catholic opinion. 
 
A voice for alternative information 
 
The third way in which the Catholic Church became a public voice for democratic values 
in Chile in this period was by supporting alternative sources of information, thereby 
challenging the regime’s official version of events, censorship laws and restricted 
freedoms of expression and opinion.  
 
The Church was not subject to the same censorship restrictions as media communications 
or publication groups,
 48
 and sponsored and oversaw two main critical publications: 
Mensaje, the Jesuit intellectual magazine publishing research on national political, social 
and economic issues, and Solidaridad, the Vicaría’s bimonthly bulletin which 
documented information on human rights work and the reality of consequences of regime 
policies and was circulated widely through Church, human rights and international 
circles.
49
  
 
Cardinal Silva also created the Academia del Humanismo Cristiano in November 1975 
which provided a space for many Left wing dissident intellectuals, who had been 
removed from positions in universities, to continue writing and researching about 
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national events. Many researchers were from two Leftist splinter parties from the PDC: 
the MAPU and the Christian Left,
50
 and their research was proscribed by the regime but 
funded by international sources.
51
  The Academia’s publication Análisis was a secular 
opposition magazine and was strongly critical of regime policies and practices. In this 
way, Leftist intellectuals were not only protected and supported materially by the Church, 
but their work became an outlet for dissident opinion in a society with little alternative 
information to what the regime provided. This information ‘fed public opinion, informing 
and denouncing’52 and was permitted by the regime, though was subject to censorship 
during states of emergency.  
 
The political impact of the Church’s public voice 
 
The Church’s denunciations of regime practices have been deemed limited in impact by 
some, based on their failure to produce any response from the regime
53
 regarding the 
truth for human rights victims, changes to the economic model to protect the poor, and 
restoration of participative political mechanisms. Additionally, the Church was limited in 
affecting direct political change by its refusal to use its voice to condemn the regime’s 
right to have taken power or to call for an alternative democratic government, as it did 
not perceive these judgments to be within its right as an institution.  
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However, the promotion of democratic values and the denunciation of inhumane regime 
practices led to greater public consciousness, provided a limited means of popular 
representation in a context of political repression and discredited the regime nationally 
and internationally. The consciousness produced by the provision of alternative 
information and criticism informed the public of the reality of social conditions, fuelled 
growing levels of discontent, helped mobilisation against the regime where opportunities 
arose, and contributed to an informed ‘No’ vote in the 1988 plebiscite against the 
extension of Pinochet’s term as President. Consciousness among the international 
community brought pressure on the regime to improve its human rights record and 
ensured a presence monitoring the 1988 plebiscite to ensure the will of the people was 
fully acknowledged. 
 
The Church countered the total absence of political representation by traditional parties, 
institutions and social organisations by adopting a representative function to expose the 
demands of Chile’s poor and persecuted. Where the poor were denied expression of 
economic demands, the Church publicly criticised the new economic model and detailed 
its effects on the poor. Where victims of repression and their families were denied the 
means to make their experiences known, the Church’s publications exposed the extent of 
violence used against them.   
 
The Church discredited the regime with its public voice, but left the active oppositional 
strategy and task of formulating an alternative to other actors: civil society and political 
party representatives. 
 28 
Chapter 2 
 
The Church’s support of Civil Society 
 
Shanty town communities, or poblaciones, suffered disproportionately under the changes 
implemented by the military regime. Father Ronaldo Muñoz, a Chilean liberation 
theologian, describes their situation in 1976:  
 
‘Today in Chile the popular sectors are facing a very difficult situation. There are the 
families of the detained and disappeared, there is the enormous amount of 
unemployed…and simply the vast majority of workers, whose salaries now do not even 
suffice for adequate nutrition.’54  
 
These sectors had benefitted most from the previous Unidad Popular, or UP 
government’s social policies, and were hardest hit by the junta’s social cuts, economic 
restructuring and political persecution. Many lower income communities also had 
traditional Leftist affiliations and so were also among the most oppositional sectors to the 
regime. Therefore the Church’s work with these sectors assumed a new political 
significance. 
 
This chapter will examine the direct or indirect political impact of the Church’s support 
for popular sectors during the military regime. Popular organisations will be examined 
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first, looking at their purposes, activities and effects, and the Church’s involvement with 
them. Secondly, the wave of national protests which occurred between 1983-1986, the 
Church’s position towards the protests and its contribution to popular mobilisation will be 
examined. Finally, the role and political implications of the Church providing refuge and 
support for the politically persecuted will be considered.  
 
While indicating some of the political impact of the Church’s support of the organising 
and protest tendencies of poorer communities of Santiago, it is notable that for most 
within the Church this impact was never an intention or even a consideration. Support 
existed in response to urgent needs and not for long term political aims.
55
 Admittedly, 
many of those working for the Vicaría de la Solidaridad with popular organisations, were 
aware and in favour of the political implications of their work and had Leftist political 
tendencies themselves,
56
 but these were personal motivations and not part of the Church’s 
own incentives. However, with the benefit of hindsight it is now possible to trace ways in 
which this work did make an important contribution to longer term political change, 
albeit unintentionally. 
 
Popular Organisations 
 
The Catholic Church had been active in the poblaciones prior to 1973 with ecclesial base 
communities, or CEBs forming part of the local parishes. These communities were a 
small group of local people who would meet together regularly to pray, read the Bible 
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and talk about their situations and expanded Church networks at the base, forming part of 
its ‘preferential option for the poor.’57  
 
After 1973, the CEBs continued to grow and promote awareness of changing social 
circumstances. Alicia Cáceres, a resident of the población La Victoria, described how at 
their Thursday night Church meetings people came to talk about their activities in the 
community and advise one another and to sing and pray.
58
 In addition, the Church also 
adopted the function of umbrella institution for many different types of social and 
economic self-help organisations formed in the poblaciones. Many of these communities 
had long histories of political organising, but needed Church protection for initiatives 
after 1973 in the context of repression and regime suspicion of organising of any sort in 
these highly politicised communities. The Church facilitated and resourced, but did not 
create these popular organisations: Schneider and Oxhorn’s comprehensive studies of the 
organisational and protest activities of these communities under Pinochet both show that 
the initiatives clearly emerged from the grassroots.
59
  
 
A ‘Zones Department’ was created in the Vicaria de la Solidaridad to coordinate the 
support of significant numbers of popular organisations, which increased sharply after the 
1981-1982 economic crisis: by there were 40,000 participants in popular organisations in 
Santiago through the work of the Vicaría by 1985.
60
 Church and Vicaría support took the 
form of provision of funding from international donations, material resources, supply 
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personnel, and professional training for popular organisations which were channelled 
towards meeting the most urgent needs of the communities, namely nutrition, healthcare 
and unemployment. 
 
The first organisational response after the coup was the comedores infantiles, which 
eventually reached the capacity to be able to provide thousands of children with a hot 
meal daily. These evolved into comedores familiares to encompass the nutritional needs 
of adults, and ollas comunes from 1981; soup kitchens in which families and neighbours 
combined resources and produced meals together.
61
 These were also linked with the 
Comprando Juntos, or ‘buying together’ initiatives, involving food bought between 
families to maximise available resources. 
 
Unemployment affected the poblaciones from the first days of the regime where many 
were dismissed from their jobs for political reasons. From early 1975 the implementation 
of the regime’s neoliberal ‘Plan of Economic Recovery’ brought a new source of 
dismissals to add to the already high levels of those without work, and unemployment 
reached 17.6%.
62
 By 1985, estimates for some poblaciones were exceptionally high: 
between 50 and 70% without occupation.
63
  
 
In response, another type of organisation formed in the poblaciones with Church 
protection and support: unemployment cooperatives, in which people would meet, buy a 
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newspaper together and look for work collectively.
64
 From these, professional workshops 
developed for productive activities, such as making items to sell, or providing a repair 
service to the community, to generate income and gain skills to find alternative 
employment. 
 
As a consequence of the high levels of unemployment, many pobladores were left 
without medical coverage or access to health care, and voluntary health groups were 
established to provide basic medical care for those without alternative means. The health 
groups also provided medical assistance during the mass protest movement and provided 
basic or primary health care workshops.
65
 
 
Relations between those working in popular organisations were not always harmonious, 
however. Tensions with political activists with clear political agendas were evident, 
particularly from the side of those with a strongly religious or humanitarian approach to 
the social work.
66
 Some more independent organisations found the Church too 
paternalistic and controlling in its approach, and were frustrated by their limited 
autonomy in a context where the Church had great influence.
 67
 These tensions were the 
product of thousands of people with multiple agendas attempting to work together on the 
same projects. The organisations evidently were open to manipulation, in large degree to 
the vulnerability of the participants, and though the Vicaría emphasised the 
empowerment of autonomous popular efforts, rather than traditional local Church 
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tendencies towards paternalism or charity in its documentation and analyses, this seems 
to have not always been in operation throughout the diverse operations. 
 
The Vicaría’s aims stated that Zones Department workers must: 
 
‘empower and encourage base personnel (community leaders). Provide necessary 
technical capabilities to popular groups so that they themselves can be agents of their 
own history,’ and ‘must motivate, encourage and facilitate existing and other organisms 
of the población to effectively overcome the problems they are facing.’ 68     
 
They state the meeting of basic needs as a fundamental right,
69
 and the need to capacitate 
participants, not encourage their dependence. From the late 1970s it taught leadership and 
personal interaction skills, as well as the importance of organising and collective action 
‘to encourage people to organise themselves in autonomous popular organisations.’70 
Where independent organisational ability developed, it facilitated the meeting of other 
‘wider objectives’71 as a consequence, as seen in the progression of the comedores from 
providing for children, to whole families, and with the initial employment cooperatives 
progressing to professional workshops. Lowden describes the housing committees 
formed autonomously in the 1980s as an example of how many participants in Church-
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sponsored organisations used acquired organisational experience to make their own 
demands without needing the Church as an overarching institution.
72
 
 
Effects of the support of popular organisation 
 
In his evaluation of this work, Martinez Nogueira lists some of the main impacts of the 
activities of the Zones Department of the Vicaría with popular organisations. In a 
practical sense, urgent nutritional, income and other basic needs were met, which was 
usually the immediate concern of the community. He also shows how through the effort 
and commitment required by participants, they achieved a sense of belonging, which in 
turn helped to facilitate and expand the organisational life of the community. These 
numerous active groups illustrated ‘the preservation of popular organisation at the level 
of the población.’73 Those involved often gained a new confidence and awareness of their 
own capabilities.
74
  
 
The Church’s support of popular organisations also united people of different political 
persuasions, often with historic rivalries or distrust, who by working together for a 
common social goal, were more able to overcome their differences. This occurred 
particularly between members of the PDC and Left parties.
75
 Cáceres described how 
members of the Communist Party, Socialist Party, Christian Left, MAPU and MIR 
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parties were all present in the Thursday meetings in La Victoria,
76
 and the same was often 
true within the popular organisations themselves. The Vicaría also adopted an inclusive 
attitude towards the political tendencies of its staff, many of whom were atheists or had 
strong political affiliations; one of the most famous examples being communist Jose 
Manuel Parada, who was murdered by the regime in March 1985. Eduardo Bahamondes, 
who worked in the Zones Department during the 1980s, said that ‘one did not even ask’ 
about the political views of those involved, due to a culture of ‘political incorrectness’ in 
doing so.
77
 The Church also did not demand any religious commitment by those 
participating in popular organisations or from the Vicaría staff.
78
  
 
By working with popular organisations to confront and expose the failures of the military 
regime, by responding practically to the urgent material needs of communities, and by 
facilitating communal cooperation within the communities, the Church helped to 
maintain the historical organisational capacities of poblaciones that the regime had 
attempted to suppress through intimidation. This created the conditions for those with a 
political conscience to work for the return of democracy. 
 
The Church as a political refuge  
 
The military regime attempted a total eradication of the Left as a political option through 
reversing the UP’s policies, publicly discrediting the ills of socialism and through 
eliminating prominent and militant members of all UP parties. In its drive to achieve the 
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latter, all non-religious meetings were strictly monitored, and those of a political nature 
were interrupted; suspected ‘subversives’ would be arrested, then often disappeared, 
tortured or killed. For this reason political activity was either completely disrupted, or 
was forced to become clandestine. 
 
In this context, the Church became a physical refuge not only to the poor and 
unemployed, as had been its tradition prior to 1973, but also to the politically persecuted. 
Though the official Church refused to condemn the military regime through its claim to 
work with and accept all without discrimination, this was also consistent with regard to 
the persecuted Left, who it sheltered and protected regardless of political affiliation. 
 
The politically persecuted used church buildings as refuges, and worked within Church 
organisations which gave protection. In the initial and most severe wave of repression 
from 1973-1976, the Vatican embassy and the Nunciatura were also used as places of 
asylum.
79
 Human rights lawyer Roberto Garretón described the discovery of a meeting of 
the extreme Left by Pinochet’s secret police on the outskirts of Santiago. While some of 
those in attendance were killed, the rest fled, and all to different Catholic denominations, 
and ‘it did not occur to anyone to go to somewhere different that was not the 
Church…The Church protected; there was nowhere else.’80 The Church was recognised 
by believers and non-believers alike as a refuge without discrimination, and was able to 
offer protection because of its prestige in Chilean society. In this way, the Church 
prevented the imprisonment and death of many Leftist party militants, which together 
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with its moral importance, had a political impact in allowing the survival of strong 
oppositional forces and therefore maintaining the possibility of reorganisation.  
 
In addition, the Church offered a physical space for political meetings, which were not 
safe to be held in any other location. Socialist Party Senator Ricardo Núñez described 
that:  
 
‘Many parishes, many cultural centres linked with the Catholic Church gave space to 
believers and non-believers so that they could organise, including for activities against 
the dictatorship.’81 
 
Therefore in addition to the crucial survival of opposition militants, the Church facilitated 
their organisation and illegal political activity. Though it was not part of these meetings, 
nor parties, it maintained the politicisation of Chilean civil society where the regime was 
attempting the opposite. 
 
National Protests  
 
Chile’s severe economic crisis from 1981-1982, which also affected much of the rest of 
Latin America, had profound political consequences. After significant economic growth 
after neoliberal restructuring in 1975, a financial crisis at the end of 1981 caused many 
bankruptcies across the country, GDP declined to minus 14%, and both inflation and 
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unemployment rose: to 27% and 28.5% respectively.
82
 These conditions discredited the 
regime’s new economic model, the success of which had been publicly referred to 
regularly by Pinochet in the 1970s to justify and legitimate his prolonged hold on power. 
Lower income sectors, many of whom had already been unable to support themselves 
adequately in the 1970s ‘growth’ period due to the lack of redistribution, were adversely 
affected by the crisis. 
 
As a result, a national protest movement emerged which was initially led by a large 
copper miners’ union, the CTC, but eventually incorporated many other grassroots, 
professional, union and women’s organisations, culminating in an autonomous network 
of opposition organisations called the Asamblea de la Civilidad in April 1986. The 
protests were the first oppositional activities calling for the end of the regime since the 
coup in 1973. The first occurred on the 11
th
 May 1983 in Santiago, and they followed 
almost monthly for the next three years, quickly spreading across the country. 
 
Protest activities included strikes, marches, boycotts of public transport, protests in 
universities, banging pots and pans on the streets as symbols of economic shortages and 
blocking roads with burning tyres. The common goal was to demand the end of the 
regime and the beginning of a new democracy, declared with the slogan ‘Democracy 
Now, Pinochet Out’83. The majority of protests were peaceful, though where the armed 
forces and police responded with repression, their conflicts with protesters were often 
violent, causing injuries and some deaths.  
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The Church’s response to the protests was mixed. The hierarchy criticised all violence 
but affirmed that it was legitimate to protest.
84
 Some conservative Church elements, 
along with much of the right-wing and upper income sectors in Chile saw the protests as 
a threat of instability and of a possible return to the pre-1973 unrest, and were concerned 
that if the protests were not contained, any political change would be violent and 
unstable.
85
 The popular Church however, including base communities and many priests 
located in poblaciones, took an active part in the protests. 
 
Similarly to the way in which Church premises offered protection and refuge to political 
party militants, they also provided the locations in which many of the protests were 
planned,
86
 particularly by young people. Health centres were also established in local 
parishes to attend to those who were injured from the protests and enable their recovery. 
 
Oxhorn emphasises the importance of differentiating between popular organisations and 
the popular protest movement, stating that the organisations themselves ‘were an 
important form of symbolic protest’87. But it seems inevitable that where people’s 
awareness of their shared circumstances were heightened, where they worked together 
and developed mutual trust, and where they were given resources and space with which 
to organise; their ability to organise in an oppositional movement would have be 
strengthened in addition to their capacity to defend their economic needs. The Church did 
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not cause or lead the process of mobilisation, but through its promotion and support of 
popular organisation, it strengthened opposition forces and maintained their 
organisational space, contributing to their ability to mobilise effectively when the crisis 
came.  
 
Through the protests, civil society became an autonomous actor where traditionally it had 
often acted through political parties. They were a bold exposition of the failures of the 
regime, and brought hope that some change was possible.
88
 Though analysts have 
indicated that the social movement was limited in scope because of its lack of political 
leadership and coherent strategy,
89
 it destabilised the regime enough to force it into a 
limited period of apertura, or opening, in which opposition-regime dialogue took place 
for the first time in 10 years. They opened a political space and reduced fear enough that 
the fragmented political parties were finally able to assume leadership of the transition 
process and begin to search for consensus and a viable alternative to Pinochet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88
 Interview with Muñoz 08/07/09 
89
 M.A. Garreton in Eckstein, 1989 p.275 and Schneider 1995 p.189 
 41 
Chapter 3 
 
The Church’s Support of the Political Opposition 
 
 
The political opposition was fragmented and mutually uncooperative for many years 
under Pinochet, and its journey of reconciliation and reorganisation was an arduous one. 
This contrasted with the model party system Chile had exemplified for most of its history 
as a republic, in which cooperation and mutual respect was the norm. The breakdown of 
this cooperation and its slow recuperation can only be understood in the context of the 
depth of the crisis which erupted in 1973. 
 
An early respect for democratic institutions and a strong legislature emerged in Chile 
from the nineteenth century, with the first extension of suffrage occurring in 1874 and the 
incorporation of the working classes in the 1910s.
90
 A ‘tripartite’ system emerged from 
the 1930s, in which there was consistent and broad support for the main parties across the 
Left, Right and Centre of the ideological spectrum. Because of the wide range and 
strength of parties that existed, achieving a majority in presidential and congressional 
elections was impossible without party coalitions, meaning that parties were accustomed 
to finding consensus despite ideological differences. 
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This consensus and cooperation broke down during the Unidad Popular, or UP 
government of Salvador Allende from 1970-1973, which was a coalition of six parties of 
Leftist ideological orientation. The structural reforms of the previous Demócrata 
Cristiano, or PDC, government from 1964-1970 had already caused fragmentation within 
parties and defensiveness from the Right, therefore causing an open hostility towards 
Marxist Allende from the Right from the moment of his election in 1970. The UP’s 
proposals, including constitutional amendments, nationalisations of all firms of a certain 
size, and extensive agricultural expropriation,
91
 provoked immediate opposition from the 
Right, and by 1972 had also alienated the PDC, who together blocked the initiatives from 
being passed in Congress. This polarisation caused political stalemate, exacerbated by 
economic collapse and extreme social discontent. In response, the Right and Centre 
parties sought the military overthrow of Allende’s government in September 1973.    
 
As we have seen, the military junta blamed the crisis on the failure of the Chilean party 
system and the ills of political parties.
92
 Aside from the parties of the Right, which 
voluntarily disbanded in favour of military rule, the UP coalition parties were declared 
illegal and all others in recess, until 1977, when all parties became illegal, including the 
Centrist PDC. This meant that not only was hostility between parties of different 
ideologies at its peak in the 1970s, but their suppression through forced exile, arrest and 
disappearance limited individual parties from developing strategy, coherence and cross-
party communication. Therefore, it took many years for trust, consensus and cooperation 
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between parties to be regained. This chapter will outline this process, and how it was 
aided by the Catholic Church’s initiatives for reconciliation and dialogue. 
 
The 1980 Constitution 
 
A new Constitution was ratified by a plebiscite on the 11
th
 September 1980, in which the 
regime fully institutionalised itself, its possible perpetuation in power was planned until 
1997, and the restrictions on political party and citizen participation in the transition were 
more limited than as announced in 1977. Its implementation was a turning point for the 
opposition, which realised the armed forces’ lack of intention to relinquish power. The 
Left was weak due to severe repression, and the institutionalisation of the regime 
produced a cleavage between already fragmented parties. In addition to a major split in 
the Socialist Party in 1979 into two main groups following their respective leaders 
Cladomiro Almeyda and Carlos Altamirano, the whole Left became divided into two 
main positions: one, advocating an insurrectionary strategy to overthrow the regime by 
force as it was clear the armed forces had no intention of handing full power back to 
Chilean citizens, and the other, advocating a peaceful transition based on negotiation with 
the regime, out of a belief that it could not be defeated militarily and that violence was 
not a valid democratic solution. The former position was adopted by the Communist 
Party and the Almeyda Socialists, and the latter by the Altamirano Socialists, later known 
as the Núñez Socialists.    
 
 44 
The latter position was also shared by the PDC. The PDC was active in an opposition 
campaign to vote ‘No’ in the 1980 Constitutional Plebiscite, which was permitted by the 
regime for appearances of competition. It had rapidly become the leading oppositional 
voice against the regime in Chilean society, as due to its Centrist position it had the 
advantage of having some ability to negotiate with some members of both Left and Right. 
The ratification by plebiscite of the 1980 Constitution was upheld by members of the 
political Right as ‘a clear demonstration of the support that the Government had at that 
time’, and which ‘consolidated the legitimacy of the Government,’93 though some did 
recognise its restrictions on the transition to democracy, the fact that ‘it prolonged…the 
ruling military authoritarianism,’ and ‘postponed’ and ‘made more difficult…the 
evolution of democracy’94  
 
A group of the political Right began to emerge who had been in agreement with the 
reasons for military intervention in 1973, but who did not believe that the democratic 
system should be subject to such a long and transformative interruption. Though not 
active in cross-party dialogue until after the national protests began, the 1980 
Constitution made many more aware of the lack of even longer-term democratic 
intentions of the regime. 
 
Apertura and Dialogue 
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The National Protests provided a greater opportunity for oppositional activity among 
political elites. The display of extreme discontent within Chilean society brought 
representatives of the Centre and Left parties closer together with the formation of the 
Alianza Democrática, or AD, in 1983, and had a destabilising effect on the regime after 
the economic crisis, pushing it towards a limited dialogue with the opposition which 
began in August 1983. 
 
The AD was formed after the first protests from representatives from mainly Centre and 
Left political parties, though with one member of the Republican Right, a group of 
original allies of the regime who had begun to distance itself in 1983.
95
 The Communist 
Party and Almeyda Socialists were excluded from the AD due to their support of an 
insurrectionary strategy being rejected as anti-democratic by more moderate centrist 
sectors.  
 
The AD existed to reach a democratic alternative to military rule and demand the return 
of democratic norms. Though still ‘rent by discord’96 ideologically, the AD was the most 
high profile political opposition group at that time, with its formation and demands 
published extensively in El Mercurio, the leading pro-regime newspaper. Among the 
most significant of these was its document demanding ‘the orderly and peaceful recovery 
of democracy’ over a period of 18 months in response to ‘the serious moral, institutional, 
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economic and social crisis’ due to regime violations of human rights and levels of 
unemployment and low production levels.
97
 
 
The AD functioned as a representative body of moderate opposition political groups 
during the process of apertura, or political opening, which was initiated by the regime 
after the most violent protests to date in August 1983. This involved a process of dialogue 
between the regime and the political opposition to attempt to pacify the protests. Sergio 
Onofre Jarpa was appointed as the new Interior Minister, who appeared disposed to 
dialogue through initiating meetings both with union leaders at the end of August,
98
 and 
with the AD through Archbishop Fresno, who acted as mediator and host.  
 
Archbishop Francisco Fresno had replaced Cardinal Silva as the head of the Catholic 
Church in Chile in June 1983. He was not as respected as Silva by many progressive 
sectors of the Church due to his more conservative stance and Silva’s record for the 
defence of human rights through the Vicaría; however Fresno was able to act as an 
effective intermediary as he was seen as less of a threat ideologically by conservative 
sectors of the Church, the civilian Right and the regime.  
 
The dialogue between Jarpa and members of the AD began on 25th August 1983 and 
those in attendance were invited by the Archbishop. It was hosted and facilitated by 
Fresno at his own residence with two auxiliary bishops, and five members of the AD 
presented Jarpa with their basic requirements for an effective transition and establishment 
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of democracy.
99
 Two more meetings occurred during September at Fresno’s house and at 
the Papal Nuncio’s residence. However, despite Jarpa’s initial openness to the possibility 
of an apertura process, it became clear that Pinochet was not willing to make the 
necessary concessions to meet the demands for the transition process presented by the 
democratic representatives, particularly with regard to changes to the 1980 
Constitution.
100
 With the AD representatives equally unwilling to make concessions, the 
regime-opposition dialogue broke down.  
 
The National Accord 
 
Despite the failure of negotiations with the regime’s Interior Minister, oppositional 
efforts to construct viable political alternatives did not end with Jarpa’s resignation in 
November 1984.
101
 During 1985, talks took place between moderate Left, Centre and 
Right political leaders for the first time, to try to reach a wider and more inclusive 
consensus regarding the democratic transition. Much of the democratic Right did not 
consider itself in opposition to the regime, but recognised the need to dialogue with other 
ideological groups to achieve a stable democratic future for Chile, and formed part of the 
Accord.
102
  
 
The National Accord was more closely associated with the Catholic Church than the 
Jarpa-AD dialogue because it was directly initiated by Fresno as a call to greater 
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reconciliation between political factions. Fresno invited individuals, and small groups of 
representatives from a variety of political parties to discuss the national political situation 
at his residence from March 1985. In July, by which time Fresno had become Cardinal, a 
group of political leaders from Right, Centre and Left parties met together for the first 
time in a Jesuit retreat house
103
 and produced a document detailing their areas of 
consensus and commonality. The location of these meetings was not incidental: for the 
Accord, the Church’s premises offered a degree of neutrality and a sympathetic host, as 
well as a necessary ‘immunity,’ which according to Aylwin, protected them from being 
arrested as they may have been if meeting in political party quarters.
104
 
 
Reaching consensus was slower for the National Accord than for the AD due to greater 
ideological diversity with the significant presence of the Right and more far Left groups 
such as the Christian Left. The main areas of disagreement were the extent of changes to 
be made to the 1980 Constitution, the inclusion of Marxist parties and the role that social 
mobilisation should play as part of the opposition.
105
  
 
On August 1985, however, the ‘National Accord for the Transition to Full Democracy’ 
was signed by 20 leaders representing 11 political parties - or ‘currents of opinion’ as 
they were referred to during the continued ban on political parties. The final meetings 
were not held on Church premises, as the regime had complained to the Vatican about 
political meetings being held in Church buildings.
106
 The main demands of the Accord 
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were for: an end to the states of emergency, the legalisation of political parties, the end of 
arbitrary exile, free, direct presidential elections instead of a yes-no plebiscite, an elected 
Congress and more flexibility over changes to the 1980 Constitution.
107
 The document 
was given to Fresno, who released it to the press and sent it to Pinochet. 
 
Despite the bold achievement of the participants in presenting unified demands, the 
Accord was rejected by Pinochet, who raised public objections to it in September. When 
Fresno directly asked him to reconsider in December in a personal visit, he received the 
conclusive reply: ‘Let’s turn over the page.’ The regime never publicly mentioned the 
Accord again.
108
 
 
A criticism of the Church’s role in the National Accord is Fresno’s position regarding the 
exclusion of the Communist Party, or PC. On the 9
th
 September, Manuel Chacón, the 
leader of the PC, wrote to Fresno, asking for ‘an open meeting for those of us who are 
willing to enact the immediate measures contained in the document,’ and petitioned for 
the inclusion of ‘all civil forces.’ There are also reports of Communist leaders’ four 
fruitless visits in one day to the Cardinal’s house, in which they were refused an audience 
with him.
109
 Through this apparent adversity to including the PC in discussions, the 
Cardinal appeared hostile to their views.  With this agenda and influence he possessed, he 
shaped the political nature of the document and the type of transition that would 
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eventually take place, despite claiming that one of his principal concerns was ‘the 
conciliation of all sectors.’110  
 
Critics have questioned the extent to which the National Accord was fully democratic 
while excluding a sector of the extreme Left,
111
 though most of those involved, apart 
from the Christian Left, maintained that those sectors were anti-democratic in advocating 
violence. Only a few months later, the Communist Party was irrevocably discredited as a 
player in the transition after the discovery of hidden arms and the attempted assassination 
of Pinochet by the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front. Ultimately, the exclusion of the 
extreme Left was maintained in order to guarantee the involvement of the democratic 
Right, whose presence was perceived to be key in attempting to negotiate with the 
regime. 
 
Some have called the National Accord a failure in attempting to initiate a democratic 
transition process because of the regime’s refusal to cooperate with its demands.112 In 
spite of this rejection, the Accord advanced the prospects for democratic change longer 
term: it contested Pinochet’s terms of transition and formed a platform for a clear 
consensual democratic alternative upon which the parties continued to build, until the 
eventual defeat of Pinochet in both the 1988 plebiscite and 1989 presidential elections, 
which helped ensure that the first years of transition were stable and successful.  
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Cardinal Fresno initiated and enabled this agreement between extremely diverse and rival 
groups to take place. He was an unthreatening and acceptable figure to leaders of all 
political ideologies, and as a matter of priority offered the premises and time at his 
disposal to listen to the points of view of all those invited before bringing them together 
to share areas of agreement. His commitment to reconciliation extended to promoting 
political change with the National Accord, because, despite consensus being reached with 
the signed Accord document, he directly challenged Pinochet for a response. Despite 
revealing his own preference of the exclusion of the extreme Left, the decision over this 
matter was ultimately made by the political representatives and meant that the Right 
remained part of discussions; arguably making the peaceful nature of the transition more 
secure.  
 
In supporting the political opposition for change, the Church’s actions were determined 
by Cardinal Fresno and those supporting him. This was not a whole Church initiative but 
one which Fresno himself upheld and prioritised, as part of his assumed duty to bring 
about national reconciliation and social peace. However, his actions were widely 
publicised and as the head of the Church in Chile, he modeled the Church’s stance 
towards democratic values.  Fresno was not responsible for, nor party to the political 
agreements or party reconstruction but by initiating meetings and presenting 
opportunities for dialogue between those with deep and painful historical rifts, he helped 
to build bridges and make political change more viable.  
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Conclusion 
 
The Catholic Church’s contributions to democratic change between 1973 and 1988 have 
been presented in this study in three areas of greatest impact: its public voice, its support 
of civil society opposition, and its support of the political opposition. Its main 
contributions in these areas can be summarised as follows: establishing the protection of 
human rights and full popular political participation as non-negotiable values of any 
government and exposing the regime’s failure to fulfil these criteria; helping to reduce 
citizen fear, both for social mobilisation from 1983 and for the ‘No’ vote in the 1988 
plebiscite, despite harsh repression; protecting civil society organisation; and 
emphasising consensus and commonality between democratic elements and opponents of 
the regime to overcome deep divisions and resentment remaining from the years 
preceding and following the 1973 coup. 
 
Though Cancino has argued strongly that the Church became a ‘leading political actor’113 
during this period, but I would question this assumed protagonism of the Church in the 
process of transition because it had no long-term strategy, did not seek to take power or 
create its own political alternative, and consciously avoided becoming involved in the 
details of political terms of agreement or shaping the demands agreed upon by civil 
society actors.  
 
However, while not becoming a political actor, the Church’s role did clearly extend 
beyond the moral arena into the political. In the 1970s, it began to occupy the political 
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vacuum left by the absence of political parties and activity through its representative 
function for Chilean citizens in denouncing political and economic repression, and 
through providing opportunities and resources for those with clearly oppositional political 
agendas to organise. In the 1980s, this function was extended to include the facilitation of 
agreements between members of the democratic political elite in search for a viable 
alternative to Pinochet. 
 
The difference between the Church occupying political space to promote democratic 
values and it becoming an explicit political actor lies in the fact that it supported other 
actors, while not participating directly in the political processes. It allowed civil society 
to organise, but did not organise itself around a political agenda. It aided democratic 
leaders to reach agreement and enabled negotiation without projecting its own voice into 
those agreements. It helped to make transition possible by providing what the social and 
political actors lacked: physical space, resources or mediation. 
 
In this sense, the Church became an agent for change in Chile by helping to create and 
nurture an oppositional space for others to occupy, rather than becoming the change that 
was needed itself. The political parties and civil society embodied this change by 
constituting a valid and coherent democratic alternative to ensure both Pinochet’s defeat 
in 1988, and that a stable government would follow from 1990. But the Church publicly 
promoted change, heightened civil society’s capacity to mobilise and helped enable 
coherence and cooperation within a political opposition rent by past bitterness. The 
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Church was the only institution capable of fulfilling this function at the time;
114
 that was 
considered officially neutral enough by the regime not to be a threat, that had such 
considerable prestige among all social classes, and that had the resources and 
international contacts to pursue an agenda radically different to that of its leaders.   
 
For some critics, the role for change assumed by the Church in the areas outlined in this 
study was inappropriate and improper, given its religious, not political mission; and 
many, particularly regime sympathisers, felt the Church became too outspoken during 
this period and criticised it for being influenced by the political Left. For others, it was 
not outspoken enough, and too conservative in its choices, for example, in not publicly 
supporting a vote against Pinochet in 1988 and in supporting the exclusion of the 
Communist Party in democratic dialogue. But despite the Church’s continual ‘balancing 
act’ of not appearing too involved in politics while equally not remaining passive over the 
democratic needs of the country, it was still able to promote and support the democratic 
values it believed necessary for the well-being of the country. These efforts meant, 
longer-term, that the nature of the transition after 1990 was characterised by many years 
of routine exposure and denunciation of the deficiencies of the regime, of the primacy of 
the inclusion of popular demands through participation, and was less conflictual and 
more stable through greater respect of political parties for one another.  
 
The role for change assumed by the Church in Chile under Pinochet was specific to that 
time and the particular national circumstances. After the 1988 plebiscite was won against 
Pinochet, it notably retreated from the political sphere and returned to a more traditional 
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role focussing on its religious and evangelistic mission. It also seems that the Church 
perceived itself, and was perceived by others, very differently after the return of 
democracy. All the non-Church representatives interviewed for this study were 
overwhelmingly positive in their attitudes towards the work assumed by the Church 
during the military regime, but many were not so favourable in their portrayal of it after 
1990, describing it as condemnatory and imposing on moral issues and uncritical about 
the enduring legacies of the military in political life.
115
 It retreated from the political 
arena as soon as democratic actors could resume free activity, confirming that the role 
assumed by the Church under Pinochet as an agent for change was unique to this period, 
brought about by the necessity of the circumstances.  
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